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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because Wright appealed and Defendant cross-appealed, a 
statement concerning the briefing process is in order, and of 
some significance. When Humphries filed his brief as 
Respondent, he addressed matters raised in Appellant's brief 
and included arguments concerning his cross-appeal. Wright 
thereafter filed what is captioned as a Reply Brief but Wright 
did not reply to matters raised by Humphries (as the 
Respondent) that challenged the substance of the issues raised 
by Wright on his appeal. Rather, Wright's reply brief only 
addresses matters raised by Humphries' cross-appeal. There-
fore, this brief addresses only matters addressed in Wright's 
reply brief concerning the cross-appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Even though the jury found that Humphries breached the 
agreements between the parties, the jury still found that 
Wright was obligated to pay Humpheries $15,000 due under the 
Management Agreement, calculated at $2,500 per month for 6 
months. The evidence supports such a finding by the jury and 
it was therefore improper for the Trial Court to take away the 
jury's verdict. 
Humphries does not contend he is entitled to additional 
pre-judgment interest on the $30,000 promissory note, but 
rather to have this Court direct the Trial Court to award 
Humphries interest post-judgment in accordance with the rate 
of interest stated in the $30,000 promissory note, and 
likewise award him indemnification against Wright in the event 
Humphries is forced to pay additional amounts as attorneys 
fees if collection of the note is pursued by Zions First 
National Bank. 
Humphries is clearly entitled to pre-judgment interest on 
the amount awarded him for fraud. The parties bargained and 
agreed to exchange assets having equal value, with the value 
fixed on October 4th, 1985. Even though the Purchase 
Agreement is silent as to the value of the respective 
properties to be exchanged, the jury found that both Wright 
and Humphries expected to receive an asset having $90,000 in 
value at the time of the exchange, to-wit, October 4th, 1985. 
Any difference in value should therefore bear interest from 
the date of the exchange. 
POINT I 
ASSUMING WRIGHT WAS JUSTIFIED IN TERMINATING 
HUMPHRIES, HE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED FULL CREDIT FOR 
DAMAGES HE SUFFERED BY HUMPHRIES1 MISCONDUCT. 
Assuming for argument purposes that because Humphries 
acted inconsistent with the terms of the agreement, Wright was 
entitled to fire him, what the Trial Court failed to 
acknowledge and likewise what Wright fails to address in his 
reply brief is that Wright has been fully compensated for the 
sums the jury found Humphries had spent from his employer's 
account without authorization. All of the sums the jury found 
Humphries wrongfully spent have been deducted from the 
ultimate verdict in favor of Humphries. Wright has therefore 
been made "whole" for any wrongful conduct on the part of 
Humphries, and it was clearly the jury's intent to likewise 
make Humphries "whole" because he was wrongfully terminated by 
Wright. To arrive at the net judgment in favor of Humphries, 
the Trial Court adopted the findings of the trier of fact as 
to who owed how much and made those adjustments in the 
Judgment on the Verdict. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court ordered the 
jury verdict entered, and only pursuant to Wright's Motion for 
a New Trial or in the Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, did the Court take away the verdict in favor of 
Humphries for $15,000. The record clearly supports that a 
Judgment NOV was granted by the Trial Court as compared to 
some other ruling by the Court concerning the $15,000 awarded 
to Humphries. Therefore, the Trial Court committed error in 
ruling that Wright was justified when he fired Humphries as 
manager when in fact, the jury rejected Wright's argument of 
justification and found in favor of Humphries. 
POINT II 
HUMPHRIES DOES NOT SEEK ADDITIONAL PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE $30,000 PROMISSORY NOTE 
Humphries admits that he was in fact awarded pre-judgment 
interest on the $30,000 promissory note at the rate specified 
in the note. Counsel for Wright correctly states that 
Humphries was awarded unpaid interest on the $30,000 note in 
the sum of $7,305.21, which was the amount that had accrued at 
the time of trial and was based on the testimony of an officer 
for Zions First National Bank. 
Humphries only seeks to have this Court direct the Trial 
Court to award him indemnification post-judgment for any 
interest he has to pay on the note that Wright was ordered to 
pay. If it was proper to award Humphries pre-judgment 
interest in accordance with the terms of the note, it only 
follows that Humphries should be indemnified at the same 
interest rate post-judgment. 
Contrary to Wright fs statement on page 6 of his Reply 
Brief, Humphries does not ask this Court to award him pre-
judgment interest on top of the $37,305.21 awarded him at the 
time of trial. Humphries only seeks to be totally indemnified 
by Wright for the note he signed on behalf of Wright, and 
nothing more. 
Likewise, Humphries only seeks to have this Court direct 
the Trial Court to indemnify him in the event he has to pay 
attorney's fees that the holder of the note, Zions First 
National Bank, incurs if it is required to seek collection of 
the note. Admittedly, this may occur at a future time. 
Humphries is entitled to be made whole for attorney's fees he 
may have to pay because even though Wright has been ordered to 
pay the note, he may not do so. To hold otherwise, will not 
totally indemnify Humphries on all sums he may have to pay on 
a note he signed on behalf of his employer and pursuant to the 
Management Agreement. 
POINT III 
UNLESS HUMPHRIES IS AWARDED PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
HIS FRAUD CLAIM, WRIGHT WILL BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
The Purchase Agreement does not establish the value of 
the assets the parties agreed to exchange. Humphries' 
testimony, which the jury adopted, was that since Humphries 
believed and represented to Wright that the nursery had a 
value of at least $90,000, that he (Humphries) was likewise 
entitled to receive an asset having an equal value when he 
sold the nursery. 
For purposes of assessing damages, the jury used $90,000 
as what Wright represented the Ogden property to be worth. To 
determine fair market value of the Ogden property, the jury 
chose to adopt what the property actually sold for a few 
months prior to trial and awarded damages for the difference 
in those two values, therefore finding that on October 4th, 
1985, Humphries should have received an asset having a value 
of $90,00 0. Since Humphries did not receive that value, but 
rather property having a value of $51,418, he will not be 
awarded what he bargained for unless he receives pre-judgment 
interest on the damages arising from the fraud. In other 
words, Humphries did not have the use of the difference in the 
values of the assets exchanged, to-wit, interest on the sum of 
$38,582. That amount should bear interest from the date of 
the exchange, not the date of the judgment as the Trial Court 
ruled. 
Wright quotes on page 7 of his reply brief the Trial 
Court's statement that there was considerable dispute in the 
evidence about what the value was at any given time and that 
it would be difficult to go back and award interest based on 
some unspecified figure from the past. The Trial Court simply 
missed the point in forming that conclusion. The date on 
which the parties exchanged assets is a date certain with 
absolutely no speculative nature. If the date of the exchange 
is not used as the date when interest starts, a party is 
penalized who has been defrauded, who cannot sell the 
property, and who cannot get his day in court for two or three 
years. 
Finally, contrary to the Court's statement, Les Froerer, 
the appraiser called by Humphries, testified that on October 
4th, 1985, the Ogden property had a certain value to-wit: 
$35,000. However, the jury elected to use as the value of the 
Ogden property its recent sales price, essentially rejecting 
the values given by Froerer and the values given by the 
appraiser called by Wright, Wib Cook. For the Trial Court to 
hold that interest does not accrue on the amount of damages 
arising from the fraud because the jury elects to use the 
sales price of the property for purposes of computing damages 
serves to penalize a litigant who tries to mitigate his 
damages by getting the best price for the property, a decision 
which may require him to wait for the best time to sell the 
property as Humphries did in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reinstate the $15,000 awarded Humphries 
for wrongful termination, award him pre-judgment interest on 
the damages he suffered by Wright's fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions, and also direct the Trial Court to totally indemnify 
Humphries on the $30,000 promissory note. This Court should 
therefore direct the Trial Court to recognize that in the 
event Humphries has to pay Zions First National Bank interest 
at the contract rate and attorney's fees Zions will incur when 
it files suit, that Humphries should be awarded judgment 
against Wright for all of those amounts. To hold otherwise 
will not totally indemnify Humphries. 
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